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Fixed costs play a crucial role in current models of foreign direct investment (FDI), yet 
they are almost entirely ignored in empirical treatments of FDI. We fill this gap by using 
a 1989-2001 panel of FDI flows into Iceland to examine the determinants of fixed costs 
for multinational firms and how these influence aggregate patterns of investment.  Our 
additions to research in the field include usage of several natural resource variables, and 
the analysis of data on initial entry of FDI into a developed country.  We use Heckman 
two step procedure, which allows us to account for fixed costs and their impact on 
estimation.  Taken together, we find that the standard OLS approach to the data 
incorrectly links the quantity of FDI to source country variables while in fact most of 
their role is in determining whether FDI takes place t all.   
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 In the theory of foreign direct investment (FDI), fixed costs have long held an 
important place. In Markusen’s (1984) seminal presentation of the horizontal 
multinational enterprise (MNE), one of the main benefits of the multinational firm 
structure is that a single firm that operates multiple plants reduces the average cost of 
covering firm-level fixed costs. Furthermore, in recent models of FDI, including the 
knowledge-capital model of Markusen (2002), fixed costs work to determine the 
equilibrium number of firms in these free-entry, imperfectly competitive models.2 In the 
empirical work, however, little attention has been given to fixed costs. In particular, in 
datasets where there are a large number of “no FDI”observations (as is common in 
disaggregated data), ignoring the decision of whether or not to undertake FDI can lead to 
a sample selection bias. In this paper, we explore the possibility of such problems using a 
unique dataset on Iceland that, although it mirrors that of the major FDI recipients in 
many ways, differs due to its large number of zeros. We find that controlling for this 
using the Heckman (1979) two-step method yields qualitatively different results for many 
variables, indicating that ignoring these “no FDI” observations is potentially problematic. 
 Most studies ignore fixed costs because the vast bulk of FDI data represents 
aggregate, country level investment information, and then primarily for FDI coming from 
the large, developed nations.3 As such, there is almost always FDI, leaving the researcher 
at a loss to examine what aggregate conditions play into the decision of the first MNE to 
enter a given market. Even when firm-level data exist, it is rather rare to observe the entry 
decision since in most cases, FDI has already begun before the sample starts or never 
                                                
2 Other models with imperfect competition and fixed costs include Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), 
Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2003), and Markusen and Venables (2000) to name but a few. 
3 See Blonigen (2005) for a recent review of the empirical FDI literature. 
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occurs. More importantly, these firm level choices may well differ from the driving 
forces that the aggregate models study. In this paper, we use a proprietary dataset on 
country level FDI into Iceland. There are two useful features of these data.  First, up until 
1989, there was essentially zero FDI in Iceland. This allows us to observe the entry 
decision for countries as a whole, something other data sets do not permit.  This first 
point makes our Heckman analysis particularly useful. Moreover, a majority of FDI in 
Iceland is greenfield, rather than mergers or acquisitions. While, as described Milesi-
Ferretti (2000) the latter dominates the data for FDI into developed countries, the theory 
tends to treat fixed costs as a facet of greenfield investment, making our data more 
suitable to the question at hand . Second, Iceland is a well-developed, highly-skilled 
nation. While developing countries may also have many zero observations, data shows 
that the bulk of FDI flows between the developed countries (Markusen, 2002).  If, as 
many studies argue, FDI between developed countries tak s place for different reasons 
than FDI between developed and developing countries, h  Icelandic data give us the 
opportunity to examine fixed costs for FDI in a way that data from developing countries 
do not. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple 
model of the decision to become multinational in order to motivate our analysis and 
derive predictions for the data. Section 3 describes our data and our empirical approach.  
Section 4 contains our results. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  A Model of Fixed Costs and FDI 
 In this section, we use a basic model in order to describe the factors that influence 
a firm’s decision to become multinational as well as the amount of subsidiary output 
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conditional on the decision to undertake FDI. This model bears similarities to the 
examples found in Markusen (2002) and elsewhere, although we make a handful of 
alternative assumptions that are in line with the Icelandic data we use below. 
 Consider a firm that is based in its home country. This firm produces and sells its 
output on the world market according to the price ( ; )P Q α  where Q is its total output and 
α is a shift parameter. We assume that an increase in α increases the price for all positive 
Q, that is, 0Pα >  where the subscript denotes the derivative. We also as ume that an 
increase in α increases marginal revenue for a given Q. This is guaranteed if, where 
1( ; ) ( ; )QP Q Q P Qε α α
−≡ ⋅ ⋅  is the elasticity of the price with respect to total quantity, 
0αε ≤ . A sufficient condition for this is that 0qPα ≥ . We also assume that the price 
function is such that marginal revenue is strictly decreasing in total output, which is 
ensure when 0qε ≥ . A sufficient condition for this is that 0qqP ≤ . 
 The firm can potentially produce in two locations, home and foreign. Foreign 
variables are denoted by *. Home output is q and host output is q*. Variable costs at home 
include total production costs ( ; )C q β and trade costsq . Host variable costs are likewise 
composed of production costs * * *( ; )C q β and trade costs * *t q . Both cost functions are 
increasing, convex functions of quantity. β and β* are shift parameters that increase both 





> . In 
addition to these variable costs, the firm faces firm level fixed costs F and plant level 
fixed costs γ and γ* for its home and foreign plants respectively. We assume that both F 
and γ are unavoidable and that the marginal revenue exceeds home marginal costs at zero 
output, ensuring positive production.  
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 This leaves the firm with two choices, whether to open a plant in foreign and how 
much to produce in each location. If the firm does not open a foreign plant (i.e. * 0q = ), it 
has a national firm structure and its profits are given by: 
 ( ; ) ( ; )N P q q C q tq Fπ α β γ= − − − − . (1) 
In this case, its optimal home production, qN is such that: 
 ( ; )(1 ) ( ; ) 0N q NP q C q tα ε β− − − =  (2) 
where subscripts denote derivatives. If the firm is a multinational firm, then profits are 
given by: 
 * * * * * * * *( ; )( ) ( ; ) ( ; )N P q q q q C q tq C q t q Fπ α β β γ γ= + + − − − − − − −  (3) 
which yields optimal home and host productions, qMNE and q
*
MNE, which are such that: 
 *( ; )(1 ) ( ; ) 0MNE MNE q MNEP q q C q tα ε β+ − − − =  (4) 
and 
 *
* * * * *( ; )(1 ) ( ; ) 0MNE MNE MNEqP q q C q tα ε β+ − − − = . (5) 
Since the marginal cost is increasing in quantity, these optimal choices will be such that: 
 *MNE N MNE MNEq q q q< < +  (6) 
i.e. total output is higher by a multinational firm, although its home output declines. 
Using these equilibrium conditions, it is possible to derive some predictions regarding 
output levels. 
 
Proposition 1: Consider the above firm. Its optimal output levels are such that: 
 a) Nq , MNEq , and 
*
MNEq  are increasing in α 
 b) Nq  is decreasing in β and t and independent of  β
* and t*, 
 c) MNEq  is decreasing in β and t and increasing in β
* and t*, and 
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 d) *MNEq  is increasing in β and t and decreasing in β
* and t*. 
 
Proof:  Equations (2), (4), and (5) yield the following comparative statistics, where 
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The intuition behind these results is straightforward. An increase in α increases the 
marginal revenue, leading to an increase in output.4 When the firm is a multinational, 
since marginal costs are increasing, it divides thi increase across locations. When β rises, 
marginal costs at home rise, leading the firm to decrease home output. When it is a 
multinational, it partly offsets this by increasing foreign production. Comparable changes 
happen when home’s trade cost rises. When β* rises, a multinational firm reduces foreign 
production and partly replaces it with home production. A national firm, however, is 
unaffected by this. Comparable changes happen when for ign trade costs rise. 
 In addition, we can ask how changes in these parameters affect whether a firm 
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i.e. if the variable cost savings from foreign production exceed the increase in fixed costs. 
Using equation (7), we derive predictions for when FDI of any level is likely to occur: 
 
Proposition 2: The firm is more likely to become a multinational as:  
a) β rises, 
 b) t rises, 
                                                
4 Our model can be generalized such that, as long as marginal revenue is non-decreasing in α and 
decreasing in quantity, we obtain identical comparative statics. 
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 c) β* falls,  
 e) t* falls, and 
f) γ* falls. 
 
 
Proof: Rewriting equation (7), define MNE Nπ π π≡ −△  which are calculated at their 
optimum values. Thus, (7) holds if and only if 0π ≥△ . Taking the derivatives of (7), 
applying the envelope theorem, and using (6), we find that: 
( ; ) ( ; ) 0N MNE
d




























= − <△ . 
When π△  rises, this implies that (7) is more likely to hold, implying that the firm is more 
likely to choose the multinational structure.      Q.E.D. 
 The interpretation of these is straightforward. As the costs of home production 
rise, this gives greater incentive to shift some home output overseas. As the costs of 
foreign production, including fixed costs rise, this reduces the usefulness of foreign 
production, reducing the need to become multinationl. With  respect to α, we find that: 
 ( )* *( ; ) ( ; )MNE MNE MNE MNE N Nd P q q q q P q qd α α
π α α
α
= + + −△  (8) 






>△ , implying that a rise in demand increases the likelihood of the firm choosing the 
multinational structure.  
  Using these results, we derive the following set of predictions for FDI. First, when 
demand is high FDI is more likely to occur and, assuming it does occur, there will be 
more of it. Second, as home costs rise, either due to rising production or trade costs, both 
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the likelihood of FDI and its magnitude will rise. Third, as foreign costs rise, either due to 
rising production or trade costs, both the likelihood of FDI and its magnitude will fall. 
Fourth, as the fixed cost of the foreign plant rises, the likelihood of FDI falls but nothing 
happens to the size of any FDI that occurs. 
3. Empirical Methodology and Data 
 Turning to the data, our goals are twofold. First, we desire to test the above 
theoretical predictions, in particular what factors determine whether any FDI takes place 
at all (i.e. whether profits from FDI exceed those f exporting). Second, we wish to see to 
what extent estimates from a typical FDI regression may be affected by ignoring the two-
stage decision process of whether to undertake FDI (the selection stage) and then, 
conditional on this, how much FDI to do (the treatment stage). Thus, we will compare the 
results from a Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation pr cess with those from simple 
OLS. 
 Since fixed costs govern the initial entry of FDI, a shortcoming of most country- 
or industry-level FDI datasets is that investment began long before the start of the 
sample. One possible way around this is to consider a positive flow of FDI as a signal 
that a new MNE is entering the market. This is the technique used by Razin, Rubenstein, 
and Sadka (2004) and Razin, Sadka, and Tong (2005). The downside of this approach is 
that once some FDI has occurred, a positive flow of could be because of a new entrant or 
an expansion of an existing project. Thus it is unclear how to interpret such results. While 
firm-level data would allow the researcher to observe entry, these datasets suffer from 
their own difficulties. First, most firms undertake only one or two investment projects 
across the world, implying a predominance of “no activity” observations. Second, for 
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firms to enter into such datasets, they either undertak  some level of FDI or are notable 
along some other dimension (such as size). This therefor  introduces sample selection 
issues that cast doubt on the estimates obtained from them.  
 An exception to these rules is the data of Iceland. The Icelandic data is especially 
well suited to the current problem for several reasons. First, Iceland is a stable, highly 
skilled economy with high per-capita income. These are traits that mirror those of the 
other developed countries, countries that are the major recipients of FDI.5 Second, until 
fairly recently, Iceland received little inbound FDI. Thus, our dataset, which begins in 
1989 and runs through 2001, allows us to observe the initial entry of firms from a 
particular parent country into the host. This avoids some of the problems found in using 
data from long-established hosts such as the U.S. or the European Union countries. Third, 
a great deal of Icelandic FDI is concentrated in power-intensive industries such as 
aluminum smelting. Using data on FDI in these industrie  is to our advantage since these 
are also high fixed cost industries. Furthermore, since these investments are all greenfield 
FDI, the issue of fixed costs directly applies. This is not true for mergers and acquisitions, 
investment methods that form the bulk of FDI in other datasets. 
 We use two different dependent variables in our reg essions, the flow and the 
stock of FDI from a parent country j into Iceland’s power-intensive industry in a year t.6 
These data are measured in millions of real 1995 U.S. dollars and come from the Central 
Bank of Iceland. We use the flow variable in order to make our results comparable to 
those of Razin, Rubenstein, and Sadka (2004) and Razin, Sadka, and Tong (2005). As 
suggested by Blonigen and Davies (2004), we use a log-linear specification to aid with 
                                                
5 See Markusen (2002) for a discussion of the distribu ion of FDI across country categories. 
6 Kristjánsdóttir (2005) uses the stock data for the power-intensive industry as well as three other industry 
categories. In that earlier work, roughly similar results were found. 
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the skewness typical in FDI data. This implies thatour regression specification is similar 
to the gravity specification used by Eaton and Tamura (1994), Brainard (1997), Blonigen 
et. al. (2005), and others.7 Nevertheless, in unreported results we used levels instead of 
logs and found comparable results. These alternative regressions are available upon 
request. Note that when using logs in a dataset such as ours with a large number of zeros 
that using the standard estimation procedures will drop these “no FDI” observations from 
the dataset, potentially biasing the estimates. One of our chief objectives is to explore the 
extent of this bias by comparing such results to those from a Heckman two-step 
procedure. Under this technique, we first use Probit t  regress a dummy variable equal to 
one if there is positive FDI from country j in year t on a set of controls. Then, conditional 
on being selected, we regress the (log) size of this FDI on additional control variables. 
 Our set of potential parent countries are the 23 countries that were OECD 
members during the entire sample period.8 This set of countries provided all of Iceland’s 
inbound FDI across all industries, however not all of them invested in Iceland and only 
some invested in Iceland’s power-intensive industry.9 Furthermore, these countries 
provide the large majority of worldwide FDI outflows. They therefore provide a 
reasonable group of countries to use as potential sources for Icelandic FDI. An additional 
reason to utilize this sample is that it brings us closer to that of Razin, Rubenstein, and 
                                                
7 In addition to the gravity approach, there is the “knowledge-capital” model used by Carr, Markusen, and
Maskus (2001). This model uses FDI in levels and interaction terms to deal with non-linearities in thedata. 
Due to our small number of observations and the issue  raised by Blonigen and Davies (2004), we have 
opted for this log-linear approach in order to prese ve our degrees of freedom. 
8 In their paper by Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2004) use data on 24 of the 30 member countries of 
OECD.  Our data include more countries than used in the Razin et al. paper, and our additions to reseach 
in the field include usage of several natural resource variables.  
9 The 24th OECD country was Iceland itself. Only 17 of the 23 invested at all in Iceland during the sample 
and only 4 of these actually invested in the power-intensive industry. 
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Sadka (2004) and Razin, Sadka, and Tong (2005) who use data on FDI stocks from 
OECD countries.  
 In line with the above theory and other work, our control variables include several 
specific to the parent country j. The first group of these are standard ones in FDI 
regressions: parent country GDP (GDPj,t), parent country GDP per capita (GDPcapj,t), 
parent country skill (Skillj,t), parent country trade openness (Openj,t), and the distance 
between the parent country and Iceland (Distancej). Typical results find positive effects 
from the first four of these variables and a negative effect for the last. All of these are 
defined in Table 1. Their sources are also given thre. 
 Using the theory from Section 2, however, we do not necessarily expect this. For 
example, suppose a larger parent economy has both lower domestic costs due to 
economies of scale associated with firm fixed costs (a lower β) and more consumers (a 
higher α). Therefore we might expect this country’s firms to be less like to undertake FDI 
yet if they do, they might produce more output. Alternatively, a higher parent per-capita 
GDP would be associated with a higher β, making FDI more likely, and a higher α, 
meaning more FDI if any is undertaken. A high skill might imply higher parent labor 
costs (high β), but may not have any impact on demand conditions after controlling for 
income. A high openness may reduce the need for outbound FDI since parent exports are 
relatively easy, however if FDI occurs access to inputs imported into the parent might 
then increase the amount of FDI. Distance, on the or hand, could be positively 
correlated with β*, suggesting that countries distant from Iceland are both less likely to 
enter Iceland at all and that those that do will produce less. 
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 In many FDI regressions, these parent country variables are matched with 
comparable host country variables. In our case, however, the host country does not vary. 
It is therefore not surprising that when variables such as Icelandic GDP, per-capita 
income, skill, openness, and investment costs were included, they were never significant. 
Because of this insignificance, they were excluded from the presented estimates. It is 
worth noting that when they were included, they impacted our reported estimates in only 
minor ways although due to the large decline in the degrees of freedom (our sample size 
is fairly small), many of our other coefficients became insignificant.  These alternative 
results are available upon request. 
 Although we did not include the Icelandic variables, we did include several 
variables that attempt to control for the costs in the power-intensive industry. One of the 
primary attractions of Iceland for this industry is its abundant and inexpensive 
hydroelectric power. As the name implies, one of the power-intensive industry’s primary 
inputs is electricity. As a result, when the price of electricity increases in the parent 
country or the rest of the world, this makes FDI in celand more attractive. Specifically, 
we utilize two such measures: the worldwide price of oil and the greenhouse gas 
emissions allowance of the host country. For the oil price, given the time it takes to get 
investment underway, we use the lagged price of oil (Oilt-1) when estimating whether any 
FDI occurs and the current price of oil (Oilt) n estimating the amount of FDI given that 
there is some amount. This is to account for the fact that oil prices at the time the entry 
decision is made are more likely to affect that decision. A rise in either of these is 
equivalent to a rise in β, making FDI more attractive. What can be predicted, however, is 
the permissible greenhouse emissions. The Kyoto Protocol established time tables for 
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each country, outlining the level of carbon dioxide t can emit. With a higher home 
allowance (CO2j,t), this is might be equivalent to lower pollution standards and lower 
compliance costs, i.e. a lower β and less likely FDI. On the other hand, a high allowance 
in the parent country might be indicative of high pollution levels and high damages 
associated with pollution. Therefore, in such a country, the government might actually set 
more stringent standards making FDI more likely. Similarly, when firms have more 
exposure to hydro power in their home country, we predict that they will find it easier to 
use this technology in Iceland. Therefore parent countries with more past hydro power 
production (Hydroj,t-1) at home are more likely to undertake FDI. At the same time, 
greater current hydro power (Hydroj,t) would imply less need to shift energy-intensive 
production to Iceland meaning that, given a positive amount of FDI, the level of activity 
should be lower. Despite the importance of these industry-specific cost variables, such 
items are typically not considered in FDI studies.  
 Finally, in some specifications, we include information on whether firms from a 
parent country j have previously invested in Iceland outside of the power-intensive 
sector. We do this to investigate the possibility that when one firm invests in Iceland that 
this provides information to other firms from the same parent country or that this reduces 
uncertainty about Iceland’s economic environment. Oe method of doing this is to 
include Other FDI Dummyj,t-1 which is a dummy variable equal to one if there was 
positive FDI from country j in year t-1 in some other industry. The other is to include 
Other FDIj,t-1 where we use the magnitude of this other industry FDI (which is measured 
in the same way as our dependent variable). 
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 Table 1 reviews our variables, their sources, and our a priori expectations 
regarding the signs of the control variables in each of the two stages (selection and 
treatment). Table 2 provides summary statistics for all variables and a list of countries in 
the data. 
4. Results 
 Table 3 presents our results when FDI is measured in log flows. Column 1 
contains the results from a typical OLS gravity regression.10 Column 2 reports the results 
from the selection stage of the Heckman two-step (whether FDI occurs) and Column 3 
presents those for the treatment stage (the magnitude of FDI given that it occurs). In the 
OLS regression, only three control variables are significant, GDPj,t, Distancej, and 
Hydroj,t. Both GDPj,t and Distancej have estimated coefficients typical of FDI 
regressions. Specifically, a 1% rise in parent country GDP is linked to 2.4% increase in 
FDI to Iceland. A 1% rise in distance from Iceland, however, leads to a 9% fall in FDI. 
However, as the Heckman results indicate, such infere ces need to be tempered by 
potentially misleading effects from OLS estimation that ignores the “no FDI” 
observations. 
 Turning to the Heckman results, we find far more significance in our coefficients. 
In the selection stage, five of our eight explanatory variables are significant. As expected, 
higher parent country per capita GDP, higher parent skill, smaller parent openness, and 
smaller distance make FDI into Iceland more likely. The parent CO2 allowance is also 
                                                
10 In unreported results, we used levels instead of the gravity model’s log specification. In this case, w  also 
applied the Tobit procedure since we were able to keep zero observations in the sample. Tobit and OLS 
yielded qualitatively similar estimates for our significant variables. Nevertheless, when applying a 
Heckman two-step to the level data, we found that most of the explanatory power lay in the selection stage. 
Thus, the level results pointed to the same sensitivity we found here. These alternative estimates are 
available upon request. 
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positive, consistent with the increased damage and compliance cost story discussed 
above. In the treatment stage, however, we only find two significant coefficients: GDPj,t 
and Hydroj,t. Both of these coefficients are comparable to their OLS predictions. 
 The difference between the OLS and Heckman regressions are important when 
considering how one ought to interpret regression coefficients, especially for small 
economies and disaggregated datasets where there are a large number of “no FDI” 
observations. Most strikingly, the results for distance suggest that it may be an important 
determinant on whether FDI takes place, not on its magnitude. As such, it may be more 
closely related to variation in the fixed cost of FDI, not marginal costs. Furthermore, by 
ignoring the “no FDI” observations, important information provided by other variables 
such as GDPcapj,t and Skillj,t are lost.  
In particular, it is worth noting that the predicted signs of such variables differ 
between the OLS and Heckman results. In our data, the selection and treatment stages 
obtain different signs for all six variables included in both. More importantly, comparing 
the results from OLS to the treatment stage (both of which consider the magnitude of 
FDI), we find different signs on three of these variables. As such, when comparing the 
estimates across data sets, some with many zero observations and some with few, this can 
cause misleading differences when only using OLS. For example, Blonigen and Davies 
(2004) use data on US FDI and find that parental Opennessj,t is positively correlated with 
FDI, a result they interpret as an FDI deterrent effect from trade costs. In contrast, our 
OLS results would tend to suggest that Opennessj,t ither has no effect of a slight negative 
effect on FDI. However, after dealing with the sample selection created by zeros, the 
positive coefficient in the treatment stage is consistent with their result. Thus when 
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comparing results from large countries with few zeros in the data to those from small 
countries, it is necessary to deal with the potentially greater sample selection in these 
latter data. 
 Table 4 repeats the above exercise using the logged FDI stock as the dependent 
variable. Overall, the results are similar to the flow results in Table 3 with the exception 
that more variables are significant in the OLS regression. More importantly, however, is 
that the Heckman results indicate that most of this significance drives whether or not FDI 
happens, not the magnitude of FDI given that it occurs. Furthermore, we again find 
important sign differences between the OLS estimates nd the Heckman estimates. In 
particular, Opennessj,t is positive and significant in the OLS results, but negative and 
significant in the Heckman selection stage. Thus, these results also indicate the potential 
dangers of using the standard gravity model approach when fixed costs and “no FDI” 
observations are important features of the economic environment. 
 Table 5 repeats the Heckman estimation of FDI flows but includes either the 
Other FDI Dummyj,t-1 or the Other FDIj,t-1 variables. Table 6 does the same for FDI 
flows. In no case is the other FDI variable significant. This suggests that other firms 
entering Iceland in other industries does not transmit information to power-intensive 
firms considering entering Iceland. Thus, in this ca e, we find no evidence for the 
agglomerative type effects found by Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) or Blonigen, et. al. 
(2005). Our other control variables, however, are similar in sign and significance as the 





 The goal of this paper has been to investigate the role of fixed costs in FDI data. 
Since the decision of whether or not to undertake FDI at all is central to the theoretic 
literature on multinational firms, it is important to ask to what degree failure to 
empirically model the two-stage decision process affects the inferences drawn from 
standard gravity-type regression analysis. To explore this, we use a unique data set on 
Iceland, a developed, skilled country that in many wa s mirrors the primary recipients of 
FDI. It is differentiated, however, by the large number of “no FDI” observations, a facet 
which makes it an ideal candidate for exploring these issues with real world data. 
 We find that the standard OLS regression approach does indeed lose information 
by failing to consider the selection stage of the FDI process. In particular, it can lead to 
misleading estimates on the role of items such as distance between the parent and host 
countries and parent country openness. 
 While it is always difficult to take estimates from one country’s data and apply 
them to others, a potentially serious problem for an unusual economy such as Iceland, 
there are nevertheless lessons to be gained from our exercise. First, our results indicate 
that the fixed costs in the theory do indeed play a significant role in the data. Second, 
when there are a large number of zeros in the data,failing to account for this can bias the 
estimates. As more researchers begin to use data on developing countries, industries, or 
individual firms, this indicates that there is a particular need to be cognizant of these “no 
FDI” observations and to model them appropriately. It is our hope that apart from the 
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description Unit of 
Measurement 
Source Expected Sign 
























Skill j,t Percentage of workers 
in 0/1 and 2 job 
classification 
Fraction 











Distancej Distance between 
capital cities 
Kilometers Indo.com - - 
Hydroj,t Hydropower output of 








Oil t World price of a 












CO2j,t+1 Greenhouse gas 
emission allowance in 
manufacturing for j in 











Dummy = 1 if j had 
FDI in another 








FDIj,t-1   
Amount of FDI j had 










Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Sample Countries (in logs) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
FDI Flows 28 1.178792 1.769981 -3.18389 4.299045 
FDI Stocks 44 3.085803 1.358933 .450276 5.065949 
GDPj,t 299 -1.042364 1.416335 -4.257324 2.194755 
GDPcapj,t 299 10.01785 .5923157 7.787382 10.98385 
Skill j,t 264 -1.547889 .3486501 -2.659199 -.6489697 
Distancej 299 -5.742244 .6350922 -6.509651 -4.060523 
Hydroj,t 299 2.297954 2.56579 -3.963316 5.871174 
Oil t 299 .0822692 .1998094 -.403399 .3950699 
CO2j,t+1 299 6.431794 .1789369 6.200509 6.76273 
Openj,t 299     4.120162 .5563562 2.767778    5.654116 
 
Australia  Austria  Belgium  Canada  Denmark  
Finland  France  Germany  Greece  Ireland  
Italy  Japan  Luxembourg  Netherlands  New Zealand  
Norway Portugal  Spain  Sweden  Switzerland  
Turkey  UK  United States   
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Table 3: FDI Flows into Iceland 
 OLS Heckman Two-Step 
  Selection Treatment 













Skill j,t -1.858 
(-0.88) 


















 -3.774*  
(-1.83) 
Oil t -.939 
(-0.68) 








Hydroj,t-1  .094 
 (1.03) 
 
Oil t-1  .999 













Adjusted R2 0.5127  




Table 4: FDI Stock into Iceland 
 
 OLS Heckman Two-Step 
  Selection Treatment 










































































Table 5: The Effect of Other FDI on FDI Flows 
 Other FDI Dummy Other FDI 
 Selection Treatment Selection Treatment 













































































   

























Table 6: The Effect of Other FDI on FDI Stock 
 Other FDI Dummy Other FDI 
 Selection Treatment Selection Treatment 













































































   

















Mills Ratio 1.534 
(0.90) 
1.805 
(0.72) 
 
